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Abstract 
This paper uses village level data on individual voters to ask what are the factors which determine the 
probability of whether an individual votes? Is this probability greater for national compared to local 
elections? And is there evidence that people are more likely to vote today than they were in the past? 
Allied to these questions is another set of questions relating to the choice of candidates. What are the 
factors that make for women’s autonomy in voting, meaning that they cast their vote without 
reference to their spousal instructions? What are the factors which contribute to people voting for 
candidates who are of their own caste? And, lastly, what are the factors which contribute to people 
voting for candidates who have a reputation for honesty and fairness? 
Needless to say, voting in elections is just one facet of political participation. Another might be 
attending and participating in political meetings. This is particularly relevant in Indian villages since 
the Constitution (73rd Amendment) Act of 1993. This made it mandatory for all villages to have a 
village council (hereafter, Gram Sabha) consisting of all registered voters on the electoral roll of a 
village. The Gram Sabha was to be entrusted with the power of supervising the functioning of the 
elected village panchayat and to approve the panchayat’s development plan for the village and the 
associated budget. Consequently, in addition to voting, electors in villages had another form of 
political participation: they could attend Gram Sabha meetings and also participate in its discussions. 
This paper also analyses the factors which determine attendance and participation in such meetings.  
A worrisome feature of the results was the high proportion of married women reporting that they cast 
their vote according to their husbands’ instructions and further that, this proportion was impervious to 
the education level of the women. Women’s education would not appear, from these results, to reduce 
the power of patriarchy. Another source of anxiety was the gender gap in the proportion of men and 
women who took part in Gram Sabha discussions. This would suggest that the reservation of village 
panchayat positions (including that of panchayat pradhan, or village president) for women was a step 
in the right direction for the empowerment of women. In contrast, there were no inter-social group 
differences in participation in Gram Sabha meetings. 
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1. Introduction 
 If countries have a ‘unique selling point’ then India’s must surely be that, with over 700 
million voters, it is the world’s largest democracy. Allied to this is the enthusiasm with which Indians 
have embraced the electoral process. The turnout in Indian national elections has been over 62% in 10 
of the last 15 national elections with 66% of eligible voters voting the 2014 Lok Sabha 
(Parliamentary) elections; the last time that a US Presidential election came close to matching this was 
the 60% turnout in the 1968 election between Nixon and Humphrey.  
 Against this backdrop, this paper uses village level data for India on individual voters to ask 
what are the factors which determine the probability of whether an individual votes? Is this 
probability greater for national compared to local elections? And is there evidence that people are 
more likely to vote today than they were in the past?  Allied to these questions is another set of 
questions relating to the choice of candidates.  What are the factors that make for women’s autonomy 
in voting, meaning that they voted without reference to their spouses’ instructions? What are the 
factors which contribute to people voting for candidates who are of their own caste that is, ‘group 
identity’ voting? And, lastly, what are the factors which contribute to people voting for candidates 
who have a reputation for honesty and fairness? 
 These specific questions are, in turn, grounded in a number of general hypotheses about 
people’s motivation to vote. Traditional theories of voting are based on an individualistic model of 
voting. On this view of voting, it is not clear why a rational individual, on a purely cost-benefit basis, 
would bother to vote: the chances of an individual vote influencing the electoral outcome are 
infinitesimally small while the costs of voting – taking time off work, standing in a long queue – are 
real and not insubstantial (Downs, 1957).  However, given the far from negligible turnout witnessed 
in elections throughout the world, it is clear that people do take the trouble to vote. 
One reason why people vote is because of ‘group identity’ voting. In the Indian context, 
Srinivas (1955) coined the term ‘vote banks’ to mean the exchange of benefits and favours to groups 
of citizens in return for their political support. Vote banks had three essential features: political parties 
which, at the time Srinivas was writing, was essentially the Congress party; a village ‘middle man’, 
usually a high caste landowner who was a party member and who had agency over groups of voters; 
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and voter groups. There was then a patron-client relationship between party and ‘middle man’, and the 
middle man and voters, based on a system of reciprocal favours.  
Vote banks go some way towards explaining why people in India turn out to vote in such 
large numbers. Downs’ (1957) argument was based on the belief that the costs of voting – gathering 
information about parties and candidates, registration, time spent to/from/at the polling station – were 
specific to the voter and were likely to exceed the benefits from voting. The latter are in the form of 
collective goods and their benefit to a specific voter are likely to be zero.1 However, in the context of 
‘vote banks’, many of the benefits of voting may be private benefits paid to groups of voters for their 
electoral support and may be quite substantial. 
 Favours to voters took essentially two forms: the provision of local public goods targeted at 
particular groups, say a paved road or a school in a locality in which people from a group were 
concentrated; the provision of private benefits to targeted groups of (usually poor) voters, often in the 
form of cash payments or gifts in kind like cycles, sewing machines, and illegally supplying below 
poverty line (BPL) cards to voters who do not qualify for these (Breeding, 2011).  This raises the 
interesting question, addressed by Schedler and Shaffer (2007), of how one should distinguish 
between favours granted through the public purse (‘local’ public goods) and payments in cash and in 
kind. Indeed, even when direct payments are made they should not necessarily to be viewed as purely 
commercial transactions; instead, they may reflect a socio-cultural relationship between the patron 
and client, embodying ‘obligation and reciprocity’ and an egalitarian transfer of resources from rich to 
poor (Srinivas, 1955).  
Inglehart (2000) points out that the transition from group identity to individualistic identity is 
a part of the process of economic development broadly conceived. On this criterion, the importance of 
the group as a source of votes is decreasing in the Indian polity. Over half a century after Srinivas 
(1955) formulated his theory of vote banks, Breeding (2011) observed that “while the structure of 
vote banks remains largely unaltered the meaning of obligation and reciprocity in modern vote banks 
has completely altered.”  Indian politics has changed considerably since the days that the Congress 
                                                     
1 Besley et. al. (2012) suggest that, in the context of Indian villages, residents in the Chief Councillor’s village 
had greater access to public goods than residents in other villages. 
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was the dominant party. Firstly, the rise in party competition means that there are now many more 
parties attempting to attract the vote of the same group of voters. Vote banks have thus become an 
inefficient form of electoral campaigning: parties feel obliged to supply benefits but inter-party 
competition means that voters feel under no obligation to reciprocate with their votes.  
Secondly, the possibility of free-riding has now become greater, particularly so with a stricter 
enforcement of the secret ballot. The Electoral Commission of India (ECI) has progressively tightened 
its views on permissible campaigning practices through its Model Code of Conduct. At the start of an 
election period, this Code sets out an elaborate set of parameters within which elections should be 
conducted; in particular, under this code, the ‘payment for votes’ is illegal and there are severe 
restrictions on the use of public resources, particularly by incumbent governments, to ‘seek votes’.  
Consequently, the reliance of parties in India on vote banks to deliver electoral approval is 
based more on hope than on expectation and, as these hopes are more often than not belied, parties 
will begin to see that the cost of maintaining ‘vote banks’ outweighs their benefits. Overlaying the 
fickleness of vote banks is the fact that running such client groups can easily cause parties to fall foul 
of the ECI’s strictures and, thereby, risk severe penalties including disqualification.2 In India today, as 
Breeding (2011) observes, “vote banks are social displays of wealth on the part of political parties to 
attract, primarily low-income citizens; they are gestures, historical remnants of a system in which the 
rules governing the game have changed” (p.77). 
 So, in order to explain why the turnout in Indian elections is so high one has to explain why 
people bother to vote even though their vote may not be decisive. In addition to opportunistic electoral 
politics, there are several, more general, explanations for this paradox of (not) voting. As Geys (2006) 
observes, the instrumental theory of voting holds that an action has value only if it affects outcome.  
Sen (1977) argued that if “outcome” was narrowly defined as serving one’s own interest, to the 
exclusion of any others, then a person acting in such a manner might be ‘rational’ but he would also 
be a fool.  Indeed, Sen (1977) argued that people act out of a myriad motives many of which are 
                                                     
2 As a consequence of employing over 2 million workers during elections, the ECI’s observers are ubiquitous 
and, since they are drawn from the ranks of those in civilian employment, cannot be easily identified. In 
addition, the Indian media seizes upon any infractions of the Model Code and affords them considerable 
publicity.  
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unconnected with self-interest.  One of these is ‘sympathy’, another is ‘commitment’.  Even if it is 
argued that ‘sympathy’ is just an economic externality, Sen (1977) argues that commitment involves a 
counter-preferential choice, destroying the crucial assumption that the chosen alternative must be 
better than the others – “it drives a wedge between personal choice and personal welfare” (p. 329).  
Consequently, the high turnout in elections “may be guided not so much by expected utility 
maximisation but by something simpler, viz. just a desire to record one’s true preference” (p.333).     
The concept of ‘expressive voting’ elaborates upon, and extends, the view of people voting to 
record their preference.  In terms of ‘expressive voting’,  people vote not for instrumental reasons – 
that is to effect change – but rather to express an opinion or a point of view, regardless of whether that 
turns out to be the winning opinion.  This view has been articulated by inter alia Brennan and 
Lomasky (1993) and Hamlin and Jennings (2011).   
All this is not to say that expressive voting cannot be self-interested or not result in change.  
The 2014 Indian election results, which led to a landslide victory for the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) 
under Narendra Modi, can be interpreted as an expression of the electorate’s distaste for the 
ineffectual, dynastic government led by the Congress Party. As Banerjee (2014) argues that, “for 
many Indian voters, voting is not just a means to elect a government…rather the very act of voting is 
seen by them as meaningful, as an end in itself, that expresses the virtues of citizenship, 
accountability, and civility that they wish to see in ordinary life, but rarely can. ” (p. 3)  
For all these reasons this paper analyses the decisions of individuals, rather than of groups, on 
whether to vote and the basis on which to vote.  Of course, in making such decisions, individuals are 
constrained by group identity, whether it is women burdened by the strictures of patriarchy or by 
persons voting on the grounds of caste loyalty.  All these issues – women’s autonomy, caste loyalty, 
and, indeed, the (possibly futile) desire for honest candidates - are central to political participation in 
rural India. The novelty of this paper is that it addresses them using a unique set of data on individuals 
living in nearly 250 villages distributed over 18 different Indian states.  This enables it to provide 
quantitative answers to questions relating to voting and meetings in contrast to answers based upon 
qualitative responses (for example, Banerjee, 2014). The next section describes the data used and the 
subsequent sections provide the analysis.  
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Voting in elections is just one facet of political participation. Another might be attending and 
participating in ‘political meetings’.  This is particularly relevant in Indian villages since the 
Constitution (73rd Amendment) Act of 1993.  This made it mandatory for all villages to have a village 
council (hereafter, Gram Sabha) consisting of all registered voters on the electoral roll of a village.  
The Gram Sabha was to be entrusted with the power of supervising the functioning of the elected 
village panchayat and to approve the panchayat’s development plan for the village and the associated 
budget.  Consequently, in addition to voting, electors in villages had another form of political 
participation: they could attend Gram Sabha meetings and also participate in its discussions.  This 
paper also analyses the factors which determine attendance and participation in such meetings. 
2.  Data and Preliminary Analysis  
The data for this paper is from the Rural Economic and Demographic Survey (REDS) of 2006 
covering 18 states in India and encompassing 8,652 households.  Members of these households were 
asked whether they had voted in the period covering the (i) current panchayat election (ii) the 
previous panchayat election, and (iii) the previous to previous panchayat election. They were also 
asked the election level at which they voted: (i) for the gramt pradhan (village president); a ward 
member of the panchayat; (iii) a member of the state legislative assembly (MLA); (iv) a member of 
the national parliament (MP).   
In total, there were 272, 532 responses to this question, from 25,995 individuals.  Of the total 
of responses, 75% (204,984) did, and 25% (66,714) did not, vote.  The respondents were also 
distinguished by religion and caste.  So, for example, 78% of Scheduled Caste (SC), and 76% of Other 
Backward Classes (OBC), respondents voted compared to 74% of Scheduled Tribe (ST), and 74% of 
Upper Caste (UC), respondents.  A test on the difference in proportions of those who voted between 
persons from the SC and the UC showed that these differences were significantly different from zero 
for all three election periods: current, previous and previous to previous.  However, it was only for 
local elections that the proportion of persons from the SC who said they had voted was significantly 
different from that of UC persons; there was no significant difference between the two groups in the 
proportions of their members who voted in national elections. 
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It was hypothesised that an individual’s decision to participate in the electoral process would inter 
alia depend upon (a) social; (b) economic; and (c) demographic factors. These factors capture the 
primary socio-economic characteristics driving electoral participation in rural India. Understanding 
electoral participation through the perspective of these socio-economic determinants will also help us 
in identifying the “ideal” type of voter in rural India. Thus, an understanding of who typically votes in 
elections will be gained. 
We used the following conditioning variables or factors in our analyses:    
a) Social factors: 
These include the social group to which the household belonged: SC, ST, OBC, and UC; 
b) Economic factors: 
These include the primary occupation of the person: 
a. Self-employed in agriculture 
b. Self-employed in non-agriculture 
c. Agricultural wage labourer 
d. Non-agricultural wage labourer 
e. Salaried 
f. Family Worker (agriculture and non-agriculture) 
g. Household worker 
h. Retired, dependent, or student;  
 
And the educational level of the person: 
a. Illiterate 
b. Educated up to primary level 
c. Educated up to secondary level 
d. Educated up to higher secondary level or uncompleted college 
e. Educated with a degree or higher   
c) Demographic factors: 
8 
 
These include the person’s gender and age. 
The equation to be estimated can be expressed as: 
 
𝑃𝑃(𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 1) = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝛽𝛽2𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖 +  𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖   (1) 
 
Where 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the outcome variable of interest (whether individual i residing in village v voted 
in the election / participated in a Gram Sabha meeting). 𝛼𝛼 represents unobserved individual and 
village-level characteristics, 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is a vector of individual-specific characteristics, detailed above, 
encompassing the social, economic, and demographic factors that could determine electoral 
participation, 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖 are village fixed-effects, and 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the random error term.  
The average age of the 25,995 voters, referred to above,3 was 42 years, 80% were married, 
and the division by gender was almost equal with 51% male and 49% female voters. It is worth 
emphasising that the division of the sample is by social group: SC, ST. OBC, and UC.  Each of these 
groups can contain persons of different religions. So, for example, the SC could comprise Hindus, 
Christians, and Buddhists while the OBC and the UC could contain both Hindus (mostly) and 
Muslims (as a minority). Although this study does not explicitly study the voting behaviour of 
Muslims in Indian villages it is worth saying something about this Muslims comprise about 15% of 
India’s population, In our own study –which, as stated above, does not explicitly examine the voting 
behaviour of Muslims – it was found that 31% of Muslim respondents, compared to 24% of Hindu 
respondents, did not vote and further that this difference between the two groups was statistically 
significant.4 
Figures 1-3 shows some of the salient features of the voters in terms of their social group, 
educational level, and occupation. 
 
                                                     
3 To recapitulate, these were voters who answered whether they had voted in the period covering the (i) current 
panchayat election (ii) the previous panchayat election, and (iii) the previous to previous panchayat election and 
the level of election at which they had voted. 
4 For academic studies of the political participation of Muslims see  Rowley and Smith (2009), Potrafke (2010), 
and Hanusch (2013). 
9 
 
Figure 1: Social Group of the Voters (%) 
 
 
Figure 2: Educational Level of Voters (%) 
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Figure 3: Occupations of the Voters (%) 
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So, in total there were 12 elections in the villages covered by the sample: Parliamentary and 
Assembly (collectively referred to as ‘national’) × three election periods (current, previous, and 
previous to previous panchayats). Since the panchayat periods are not specifically defined, we 
assumed that they were of 5-7 years duration so that the earliest panchayat election in the sample (the 
‘previous to the previous’ panchayat) was held around (approximately) 1994. 
A person is eligible to vote in India at the age of 18 years. So, only those persons in the 
sample who were 18 years old in 1994 – and, therefore at least 30 years of age in the survey of 2006 - 
would have been eligible to vote in all 12 elections.  So, from the from 25,995 individuals who 
answered the voting question, we chose the 18,322 persons who, by virtue of being older than 30 
years at the time of the survey, could have voted in all 12 elections.  On average, these persons voted 
in 9.2 of the 12 elections in which they could have voted, yielding an average participation rate of 
77%.  There were 199,087 responses from these 18,322 voters to the “did you vote in election X?” 
question and, of these 199,087 responses, 85% were positive. 
Table 1 shows the results of estimating a logit model, for respondents above 30 years age, in 
which the dependent variable, y, took the value 1 if the person i, i=1,…N, voted (yi=1) in a particular 
election and zero if he/she did not (yi=0).  
 Interaction effects were used to model whether the effect of one conditioning variable varied 
according to values of another variable.  In the context of this study, a natural question to ask is 
whether the effects of some of the conditioning variables (social group, age, gender, marital status, 
education, and occupation) on the decision to vote varied according to whether the election was 
‘national’ or local and also according to whether it was a current or a past election. In order to answer 
this question we estimated a general model in which the conditioning variables were allowed to 
interact with the national/local election variable (NE) and, also, separately with the current/past 
election variable (CE). By virtue of this characteristic, this model is referred to in the paper as the 
general interaction model (GIM). 
3. Model Estimation and Predicted Probabilities   
The GIM was estimated on 181,556 responses which was the number of responses which had 
non-missing values associated with all the conditioning variables.  The coefficient estimates, in terms 
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of the odds ratios, are shown in an Appendix to this paper; these estimates are employed in the body 
of the paper to make predictions about the probability of voting under various scenarios relating to the 
values of the conditioning variables.  Following the advice contained in Long and Freese (2014), the 
method of model interpretation used in this paper is based upon predicted probabilities rather than on 
the odds-ratios shown in Table A1 of the Appendix. 
Overall, the GIM predicted that, yi=1 for 85.4% of the 181,556 responses with a 95% 
confidence interval of [85.2%, 85.6%].5 This prediction was based upon using the equation estimates 
in conjunction with the observed values of the conditioning variables to compute Pr[yi=1] for each 
response and, then to average over these 181,556 predicted probabilities to obtain 85.4%. [An 
alternative method of prediction is to hold the values of the conditioning variables at their mean 
values and to use the equation to predict the probability of voting. Under this scenario, 
Pr[yi=1]=91.9% suggesting that there is a difference between the “average probability over all 
persons” (85.4%) and the “probability of the average person”.  
 The specific results from the estimated GIM are shown in Table 1 in terms of probabilities 
(column 2) and the marginal probabilities (column 3) of voting. Column 2 shows that the predicted 
probability of a SC response being positive is 85.99%. This probability was obtained by setting SC=1 
for all the 181,556 cases but leaving the values of the other variables for each case unchanged (that is, 
as observed in the sample).  Applying the equation estimates (shown in Table A1 of the Appendix) to 
these revised values yields a predicted probability of 85.99%. It is important to emphasise that, in 
computing this probability, all the interaction effects (the interactions of SC with NE and with CE) are 
taken into account. The predicted probability of voting of the ST, OBC, and the UC are also computed 
similarly. 
 The marginal probability associated with a variable refers to the change in the outcome 
probability consequent upon a unit change in the value of the variable, the values of the other 
variables remaining unchanged. For discrete variables (as, indeed, are, except for age, all the 
variables reported above), an unit change in the value of a variable refers to a move from the reference 
                                                     
5 That is, the probability of a randomly chosen response being positive will, with 95% probability, be between 
85.2% and 85.5%. 
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category to the category in question, the values of the other variables remaining unchanged.  So, the 
marginal probability associated with the SC is defined as the difference between the SC and the 
(group) reference category in their predicted probabilities of voting. Since, in this study, the UC are 
the reference category, the marginal probability associated with the SC is 85.99%-84.93%=1.06 
percentage points.  This is shown in column 3 (against the SC row) as 0.0106.  Dividing this marginal 
probability (in column 3) by its standard error (column 4) yields the z-value associated with this 
marginal probability (column 5). For the SC this is 3.75 and, as the p-value in column 6 suggests, this 
marginal probability is significantly different from zero. The marginal probabilities associated with 
the ST and the OBC are, however, not significantly different from zero. 
 Similarly, one may predict the probabilities of the responses associated with the different 
educational responses being positive.  Column 2 shows that the predicted probability of responses 
from persons with primary level of education being positive is 85.82%. This probability was obtained 
by setting PRM=1 for all the 181,556 cases but leaving the values of the other variables for each case 
unchanged (that is, as observed in the sample).  Applying the equation estimates (shown in Table A1 
of the Appendix) to these revised values yields a predicted probability of 85.82%. [Again it is 
important to emphasise that, in computing this probability, all the interaction effects (the interactions 
of PRM with NE and with CE) are taken into account]. The predicted probabilities of voting of the 
other educational categories (ILT, SEC, HSEC, GRD) are also computed similarly.  Since GRD is the 
reference category, the marginal probabilities for education are defined as difference between the 
other educational categories and the GRD category in their probabilities of a positive response. The 
marginal probability for the PRM category is 85.22%-84.29=1.53 percentage points; this is reported in 
column 3 as 0.0153 and the z value in column 5, in conjunction with the p-value of column 6, shows 
that this change is significantly different from zero.  The marginal probabilities associated with the 
other educational categories are, however, not significantly different from zero. 
 Lastly, one can turn to the probabilities associated with national versus local and current 
versus past elections.  Column 2 shows that the predicted probability of voting, when elections were 
national, was 92.2% compared to 77.86% when they were local. Similarly, the predicted probability 
of voting, when elections were held in the current panchayat period, was 88.45% compared to 77.86% 
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when they were in past panchayat periods. These probabilities were obtained by, respectively, setting 
NE=1 and CE=1 for all the 181,556 cases but leaving the values of the other variables for each case 
unchanged (that is, as observed in the sample).  The changes in these probabilities are the marginal 
probabilities associated with national and current elections: respectively, 14.34 and 6.02 points.  As 
the z-values in column 5 show, these changes were significantly different from zero.  Once again, it is 
important to emphasise that, in computing this probability, all the interaction effects (in this case, the 
interactions of NE and CE with all the other conditioning variables) are taken into account. 
 Table 1 allows one to identify the variables whose associated marginal probabilities were 
significantly different from zero: 
1. Scheduled Castes versus the Upper Castes: the probability change from the reference category 
(upper castes) is positive and significant 
2. Women versus men: the probability change from the reference category (men) is negative and 
significant 
3. Married versus unmarried: the probability change from the reference category (unmarried) is 
positive and significant 
4. Primary education versus Graduates: the probability change from the reference category 
(graduates) is positive and significant 
5. Self-employed in agriculture versus pensioners, dependents, students: the probability change 
from the reference category (pensioners, dependents, students) is positive and significant 
6. Self-employed in non-agriculture versus pensioners, dependents, students: the probability 
change from the reference category (pensioners, dependents, students) is positive and 
significant 
7. Agricultural wage labourers versus pensioners, dependents, students: the probability change 
from the reference category (pensioners, dependents, students) is positive and significant 
8. Non-Agricultural wage labourers versus pensioners, dependents, students: the probability 
change from the reference category (pensioners, dependents, students) is positive and 
significant 
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9. National versus local elections: the probability change from the reference category (local 
elections) is positive and significant 
10. Current versus past elections: the probability change from the reference category (past 
elections) is positive and significant 
The high probability of voting in elections (92% in national elections and 79% in local elections) 
flies in the face of the rational choice model of voting which weighs the costs of voting against its 
expected benefits.  However, if one considers group-based based voting (Geys, 2006) then turnout 
could be stimulated by the enforcement of group-based social norms.  According to Grossman and 
Helpman, (2001), three elements are likely to be particularly important for the existence of, and the 
ease of enforcing, such norms. First, there is the frequency of interaction between group members. 
Second, social norms will be more binding the greater the danger of social isolation if these norms are 
flouted. Third, enforcement is easier if actions are observable.  All these conditions are likely to be 
particularly important in the context of the close proximity in which residents of an Indian village live 
Indeed, as Akerlof (1976) in his paper on caste has observed, the threat of ostracism plays a big role in 
enforcing caste norms.     
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Table 1: Predicted and Marginal Probabilities of Voting  
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Conditioning Variable Probability Marginal Probability SE z value Pr>|z| 
Scheduled Caste (SC) 0.8599 0.0106 0.003 3.75 0.00 
Scheduled Tribe (ST) 0.8509 0.0016 0.005 0.34 0.74 
Other Backward Classes 
(OBC) 
0.8472 -0.0021 0.002 -0.92 0.36 
Upper Castes (UC) 
[Reference] 
0.8493     
Females 0.8460 -0.0084 0.003 -2.60 0.01 
Males [Reference] 0.8543     
Married 0.8517 0.0137 0.003 4.99 0.00 
Unmarried [Reference] 0.8380     
Illiterate (ILT) 0.8488 0.0058 0.004 1.30 0.19 
Primary (PRM) 0.8582 0.0153 0.004 3.44 0.00 
Secondary (SEC) 0.8479 0.0049 0.004 1.16 0.25 
Higher Secondary 
(HSEC) 
0.8490 0.0061 0.005 1.28 0.20 
Graduate (GRD) 
[Reference] 
0.8429     
Self-employed 
Agriculture (SEA) 
0.8593 0.0213 0.004 4.85 0.00 
Self-employed non-
Agriculture (SEnA) 
0.8572 0.0192 0.005 3.68 0.00 
Salaried (SAL) 0.8292 -0.0089 0.006 -1.53 0.13 
Agriculture Wage 
Labour (AWL) 
0.8639 0.0258 0.005 5.21 0.00 
Non-Agriculture Wage 
Labour (NAWL) 
0.8552 0.0171 0.005 3.37 0.00 
Family Worker (FWK) 0.8271 -0.0110 0.007 -1.49 0.14 
Household Worker 
(HWK) 
0.8461 0.0080 0.005 1.73 0.08 
Pensioner, Dependent, 
student [Reference] 
0.8381     
National Election 0.9220 0.1434 0.002 89.30 0.00 
Local Election 0.7866     
Current Election .88447 .06024      .0015552     38.74 0.00 
Past Election .82423     
Age at mean 0.8681 0.0028 0.000 33.06 0.00 
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4.  The Basis for Choosing Candidates 
 Given that a person voted for a candidate/party, a further question is on what basis did he/she 
chose his/her preferred candidate/party?  The REDS survey asked voters this question by offering 
them a range of possibilities. In the context of India’s political economy, three of these questions are 
of interest.   
The first concerns the autonomy of the women’s vote: do women in rural India vote according 
to their own preferences or according to their husbands’ preferences?  In this context, voters were 
asked if the reason they voted for a candidate/party was because they “were told to do so by their 
spouse”:  of the 47,640 male responses to this question, only 8% replied in the affirmative; however, 
of the 49,297 female responses to the same question, 69% replied that what had determined their vote 
was their spouses’ instructions.6 
The second question relates to the caste basis for voting: when voting, do voters primarily 
vote for candidates who are of their caste? In this context, of the 201,999 responses to this question, 
only 17% admitted to their vote having been determined by the candidates’ caste.7 
The third question relates to candidate merit: do voters choose candidates with a reputation 
for honesty and fairness? Of the 202,946 responses to the ‘honesty’ question, 60.8% said that they 
voted on the basis of the candidates’ reputation for honesty.8  
 
                                                     
6 Autonomy, in general, refers to the control that women have over their lives – the ability of women to obtain 
information and to use that as the basis for making decisions both about themselves and their intimates (Dyson 
and Moore, 1983).  Jeejeebhoy and Sattar (2001) in their discussion of women’s autonomy in India observe that 
“the cultures of South Asia are gender-stratified characterised by hierarchical relations…in which the patriarch 
or his relatives have control over family members.” In her ethnographic study of Indian elections, Banerjee 
(2014) notes that it is “mainly men who conduct public discussions of politic because venues where these 
discussions occur are traditionally masculine places. These discussions then filtered back into people’s homes as 
men brought back news of the day [and] women, who were often missing from public discussion of politics, 
often asked questions of their men requiring them to clarify points” (p.87-88). 
7 The importance of caste as a determinant of electoral outcomes in India cannot be overemphasised: see 
Chandra (2004). 
8 Corruption in Indian public life has emerged as a salient feature of the country’s political debate. In 2012, 
India ranked 94th out of 176 countries in Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index and, in 
practical terms, corruption has ramifications for almost every aspect of life in India (Witsoe, 2012; Borooah, 
2012). Consequently, it is likely that a reputation for honesty and fairness might be an important consideration 
in evaluating candidates. Indeed, the desire on the part of Indian voters to address corruption in Indian public 
life has spawned an entirely new party – the Aam Aadmi Party – which briefly came to power in the state of 
Delhi and which also won a number of seats in the 2014 Indian parliamentary elections. 
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Women’s Autonomy 
In order to throw light on the women’s autonomy question, we estimated a logit equation in 
which the dependent variable took the value 1 if the married woman said the reason she voted for a 
candidate/party was because she “was told to do so by their spouse”, and took the value 0 otherwise. 
(It is important to emphasise that a particular woman did not necessarily always vote according to 
formula – she may well have recorded a value of 1 for some elections and 0 for others).  As in the 
previous section, in order to answer this question we estimated a general model in which the relevant 
conditioning variables (social group, age, education, and occupation) were allowed to interact with the 
national/local election variable (NE) and, also, separately with the current/past election variable (CE).  
Estimated over 38,033 responses from married women who were at least 30 years of age at 
the time of the survey, this model predicted that after all interaction effects had been accounted for, 
69.3% of women would have voted according to spousal instructions but, if the women’s attributes 
had been held at the mean values, this would have risen to 78.3%.9  In other words, on average 69% 
of the votes of married women (who were at least 30 years of age) were awarded according to spousal 
instructions but there was a 79% chance that the average woman would vote as her husband told her.    
 The specific results from the estimated GIM are shown in Table 2 in terms of probabilities 
(column 2) and the marginal probabilities (column 3) of voting. Column 2 shows that the predicted 
probability of a SC female response being positive (that is, she voted according to her spouse’s 
instructions) was 67.77% while the equivalent UC (the reference category) response was 68.74% 
yielding a marginal probability of 0.97 percentage points which, as the associated z value shows, was 
not significantly different from zero. Women from the ST and the OBC were, however, significantly 
more likely to vote according their husbands’ wishes than UC (and ipso facto SC) women. Their 
marginal probabilities – that is, the difference between their probabilities (respectively, 72.78% and 
70.9%) that of UC women (68.74%) - were significantly different from zero. So, women’s autnmy 
was highest among the SC and the UC and lowest among the ST and the OBC. 
                                                     
9 The estimated coefficients from this model are not shown but may be obtained on request. 
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  Interestingly, there did not appear to be any difference between women of different 
educational levels in their propensity to vote as their husbands asked. To illustrate this point, the 
likelihood of women graduates and of illiterate women voting according to spousal wishes was, 
respectively, 68.99% and 70.41% yielding a marginal probability 1.41 percentage points which, as the 
accompanying z value shows, was not significantly different from zero. So, the estimated model does 
not find support for the hypothesis that education liberates women from patriarchal control, at least as 
far as voting is concerned.    
   There were strong occupational effects associated with the probability of women’s vote being 
determined by her husband. The probability of women from the reference occupational category 
(pensioners, dependents, students) voting according to their husbands’ instructions was 69.56% and 
this was significantly higher than the corresponding probabilities for women who were self-employed 
in non-agriculture (60.86%), salaried workers (58.47%), non-agricultural wage labourers (58.5%), and 
family workers (62.34%).  On the other hand, compared to the reference group, the probability of 
voting according to their husbands’ wishes was not significantly different for women who were self-
employed in agriculture (67.36%), agricultural wage labourers (67.56%), and household workers 
(70.46%).  So, in contrast to education, at least as far as voting was concerned, there was support for 
the hypothesis that being gainfully employed in non-agricultural activities, to a significant degree, 
liberated women from patriarchal control.   
Lastly, a lack of women’s autonomy, as measured by the probability of voting by reference to 
their husbands’ instructions was significantly higher in local elections, than in national, elections 
(72.75% versus 68.11%) and was significantly higher in ‘past’, than in current, elections (70.24% 
versus 69.12%).  Compared to national elections, the outcomes of local elections were more closely 
tied with the welfare of households and hence gave more reason for husbands to control their wives’ 
votes. Once again, it is important to emphasise that, in computing these probabilities, all the 
interaction effects (in this case, the interactions of NE and CE with all the other conditioning 
variables) were taken into account. 
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Table 2: Predicted, and Marginal. Probabilities of the Probability of Women Voting According 
to Spouses’ Instructions  
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Conditioning Variable Probability Marginal Probability SE z value Pr>|z| 
Scheduled Caste (SC) 0.6777 -0.0097 0.007 -1.35 0.18 
Scheduled Tribe (ST) 0.7278 0.0404 0.012 3.24 0.00 
Other Backward Classes 
(OBC) 
0.7090 
0.0216 0.006 3.66 0.00 
Upper Castes (UC) 
[Reference] 
0.6874 
    Illiterate (ILT) 0.7041 0.0141 0.015 0.96 0.34 
Primary (PRM) 0.6978 0.0078 0.015 0.53 0.60 
Secondary (SEC) 0.6823 -0.0077 0.015 -0.53 0.60 
Higher Secondary 
(HSEC) 
0.6860 
-0.0039 0.016 -0.24 0.81 
Graduate (GRD) 
[Reference] 
0.6899 
    Self-employed 
Agriculture (SEA) 
0.6736 
-0.0220 0.018 -1.22 0.22 
Self-employed non-
Agriculture (SEnA) 
0.6086 
-0.0870 0.029 -2.95 0.00 
Salaried (SAL) 0.5847 -0.1109 0.025 -4.49 0.00 
Agriculture Wage 
Labour (AWL) 
0.6756 
-0.0200 0.019 -1.07 0.28 
Non-Agriculture Wage 
Labour (NAWL) 
0.5850 
-0.1106 0.045 -2.44 0.01 
Family Worker (FWK) 0.6234 -0.0721 0.035 -2.06 0.04 
Household Worker 
(HWK) 
0.7046 
0.0091 0.015 0.59 0.55 
Pensioner, Dependent, 
student [Reference] 
0.6956 
    National Election 0.6811 -0.0465 0.005 -10.29 0.00 
Local Election 0.7275     
Current Election 0.6912 -0.0112 0.004 -2.49 0.01 
Past Election 0.7024     
Age at Mean 0.6984 0.0001 0.000 0.52 0.60 
 
  
21 
 
The Caste Basis of Voting    
In order to investigate the importance of caste in voters’ candidate selection, we estimated a 
logit equation in which the dependent variable took the value 1 if the voter’s response was that the 
candidate’s caste determined his/her choice, 0 if it did not. (It is important to emphasise that a 
particular person did not necessarily always vote according to caste – he/she may well have recorded 
a value of 1 for some elections and 0 for others).  As in the previous section, in order to answer this 
question we estimated a general model in which the relevant conditioning variables (social group, age, 
gender, marital status, education, and occupation) were allowed to interact with the national/local 
election variable (NE) and, also, separately with the current/past election variable (CE). By virtue of 
this characteristic, this model is referred to in the paper as the general interaction model (GIM) for 
caste-based voting. Estimated over 154,191 responses from persons who were at least 30 years of age 
at the time of the survey, this model predicted that after all interaction effects had been accounted for, 
17.2% of the responses would have voted according to caste but that if the respondent’s attributes had 
been held at the mean values this would have fallen to 10.6%.10  In other words, on average 17% of 
votes by persons (who were at least 30 years of age) were on a caste basis but there was only a 10% 
chance that the average person would vote on the basis of caste.    
 The specific results from the estimated GIM are shown in Table 3 in terms of probabilities 
(column 2) and the marginal probabilities (column 3) of voting.  The first point to note is that 
compared to reference group of the UC (from which only 15.39% of the responses chose candidates 
on the basis of caste), the likelihood of responses from the other caste groups, claiming to choose 
candidates on a caste-basis, was significantly higher: 16.16% for the SC, 18.02% for the ST, and 
18.53% for the OBC.  Indeed, the predicted proportion of ST and OBC responses claiming caste-based 
voting (respectively, 18.02% and 18.53%) was significantly higher than that for the SC (16.16%).  
It is interesting that persons from the OBC had the largest propensity to vote along caste lines. 
Jaffrelot (2003) points out that India has undergone a “silent revolution” as lower-status groups 
increasingly captured political office and used political power to alter the balance of power between 
the upper and the lower castes in the countryside.  Foremost among these lower caste groups – who 
                                                     
10 The estimated coefficients from this model are not shown but may be obtained on request. 
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originally were mobilised by the upper caste Congress Party but who now mobilised themselves 
against the Congress – were the OBC. These were castes that were not forward – in the sense of 
belonging to the Brahmin, Kshatriya, or Vaishya varnas – but who, unlike the SC, were not 
considered ‘untouchable’.  In the context of Indian politics, the OBC is a useful electoral category 
encapsulating the lower castes above the pollution line who have tried, by voting along caste lines, to 
carve out a political space for themselves.   
 Interestingly, education level and the propensity to caste-based voting had a U-shaped 
distribution. The predicted probability of responses claiming caste-based voting fell from 17.47% for 
illiterate persons to around 16.3% for persons with primary and secondary educational levels before 
rising to 18.7% for graduates and higher secondary responses.  In consequence, the predicted 
probability of graduates claiming caste-based voting was significantly higher than the corresponding 
probabilities for responses from illiterate persons or persons educated to primary or secondary levels.  
In turn, the predicted probability for responses from illiterate persons was significantly higher than the 
corresponding probabilities for responses from persons educated to primary or secondary levels. 
 In terms of occupations, the propensity for caste based voting was highest for the 
occupational reference group of pensioners, dependents, students (18.62%) and this was significantly 
higher than that for the other occupations. The lowest predicted probability of voting along caste lines 
emanated from those who were non-agricultural wage labourers (15.43%) or self-employed in non-
agricultural activities (15.8%).  Lastly the predicted likelihood of caste-based voting was significantly 
lower in national (13.17%) compared to local (21.85%) elections and significantly lower for elections 
conducted during the current panchayat period (16.31%) compared to elections conducted during the 
past panchayat periods (17.82%).    
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Table 3: Predicted and Marginal Probabilities of Caste-Based Voting  
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Conditioning Variable Probability Marginal Probability SE z value Pr>|z| 
Scheduled Caste (SC) 0.1616 0.0077 0.003 2.55 0.01 
Scheduled Tribe (ST) 0.1802 0.0263 0.006 4.32 0.00 
Other Backward Classes 
(OBC) 
0.1853 0.0314 0.003 11.60 0.00 
Upper Castes (UC) 
[Reference] 
0.1539     
Females 0.1760 0.0077 0.003 2.34 0.02 
Males [Reference] 0.1683     
Married 0.1725 0.0045 0.003 1.54 0.12 
Unmarried [Reference] 0.1679     
Illiterate (ILT) 0.1747 -0.0122 0.005 -2.28 0.02 
Primary (PRM) 0.1631 -0.0239 0.005 -4.43 0.00 
Secondary (SEC) 0.1628 -0.0242 0.005 -4.59 0.00 
Higher Secondary 
(HSEC) 
0.1867 -0.0003 0.006 -0.05 0.96 
Graduate (GRD) 
[Reference] 
0.1870     
Self-employed 
Agriculture (SEA) 
0.1813 -0.0049 0.005 -0.99 0.32 
Self-employed non-
Agriculture (SEnA) 
0.1580 -0.0282 0.006 -4.63 0.00 
Salaried (SAL) 0.1742 -0.0119 0.007 -1.79 0.07 
Agriculture Wage 
Labour (AWL) 
0.1637 -0.0224 0.005 -4.08 0.00 
Non-Agriculture Wage 
Labour (NAWL) 
0.1543 -0.0319 0.006 -5.40 0.00 
Family Worker (FWK) 0.1705 -0.0157 0.008 -1.96 0.05 
Household Worker 
(HWK) 
0.1703 -0.0159 0.005 -3.11 0.00 
Pensioner, Dependent, 
student [Reference] 
0.1862     
National Election 0.1317 -0.0868 0.002 -45.46 0.00 
Local Election 0.2185     
Current Election 0.1631 -0.0152 0.002 -8.04 0.00 
Past Election 0.1782     
Age at Mean 0.1735 0.0000 0.000 -0.43 0.67 
   
Candidate Merit 
 In order to investigate the importance of a candidate’s merit as a determinant of voters’ 
candidate selection, we estimated a logit equation in which the dependent variable took the value 1 if 
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the voter’s response was that the candidate’s reputation for honesty and fairness determined his/her 
choice, 0 if it did not. (As before, it is important to emphasise that a particular person did not 
necessarily always vote according to merit – he/she may well have recorded a value of 1 for some 
elections and 0 for others). As in the previous section, in order to answer this question we estimated a 
general model in which the relevant conditioning variables (social group, age, gender, marital status, 
education, and occupation) were allowed to interact with the national/local election variable (NE) and, 
also, separately with the current/past election variable (CE). By virtue of this characteristic, this model 
is referred to in the paper as the general interaction model (GIM) for merit-based voting. Estimated 
over 156,325 responses from persons who were at least 30 years of age at the time of the survey, this 
model predicted that after all interaction effects had been accounted for, 60.3% of the responses 
would have voted according to merit (honesty and fairness) but that if the respondent’s attributes had 
been held at the mean values this would have risen to 63.8%.11  In other words, on average 60.3% of 
votes by persons (who were at least 30 years of age) were on a merit basis but 63.8% of votes from 
the average person were on the basis of merit. 
  The specific results from the estimated GIM are shown in Table 4 in terms of the probabilities 
(column 2) and the marginal probabilities (column 3) of voting.  The first point to note is that 
compared to reference group of the UC (from which 60.58% of the responses chose candidates on the 
basis of merit), the likelihood of responses from the other caste groups, claiming to choose candidates 
on a merit basis, was not significantly different: 60.71% for the SC, 61.71% for the ST, and 59.7% for 
the OBC.  
 In terms of the educational level of voters, there was a positive relationship between 
education and the propensity to vote on the basis of candidate merit.  The predicted probability of 
responses being in favour of choosing on the basis of a reputation for honesty and fairness was highest 
for graduates (63.48%) and lowest for illiterates (59.07%). For all educational levels the difference in 
the predicted probabilities of merit-based voting between persons at the four lowest educational levels 
and persons who were graduates (the reference group) was significantly different from zero. 
                                                     
11 The estimated coefficients from this model are not shown but may be obtained on request. 
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 In terms of occupations, responses from persons who were self-employed in non-agricultural 
activities, and from non-agricultural wage labourers, predicted significantly higher probabilities 
(respectively, 63.28% and 62.66%) of merit-based voting - and responses from persons engaged in 
household work predicted a significantly lower probability (59.59%) – compared to responses from 
the reference category of pensioners, dependents, and students (61.07%). For the other occupations 
there was no significant difference between their predicted probabilities and that of the reference 
group. 
 Lastly, the honesty and fairness issue was less important as a voting issue in national 
compared to local elections – 56.41% versus 64.45% of positive responses – and less of an issue in 
elections conducted during the present panchayat period compared to those conducted in past periods. 
 Combining these results leads to some interesting implications. First, since household welfare 
is more directly affected by the outcome of local, compared to national, elections, candidates’ honesty 
and fairness mattered more in the former than in the latter. Second, since agriculturists were more 
likely to dominate the Gram Sabha than non-agriculturists, it was more important for the latter that 
their position should be safeguarded through the election of candidates with a reputation for honesty 
and fairness. Lastly, it is perhaps a sad comment on the direction of Indian politics that the importance 
of honesty in candidates has, in the minds of voters, devalued over time.         
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Table 4: Predicted and Marginal Probabilities of Merit-Based Voting  
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Conditioning Variable Probability Marginal Probability SE z value Pr>|z| 
Scheduled Caste (SC) 0.6071 0.0014 0.004 0.34 0.74 
Scheduled Tribe (ST) 0.6171 0.0113 0.007 1.62 0.11 
Other Backward Classes 
(OBC) 0.5970 -0.0088 0.006 -1.47 0.01 
Upper Castes (UC) 
[Reference] 0.6058 
    Females 0.5693 -0.0664 0.005 -13.94 0.00 
Males [Reference] 0.6357 
    Married 0.6021 -0.0053 0.004 -1.42 0.16 
Unmarried [Reference] 0.6074 
    Illiterate (ILT) 0.5907 -0.0441 0.007 -6.73 0.00 
Primary (PRM) 0.6107 -0.0242 0.007 -3.64 0.00 
Secondary (SEC) 0.6184 -0.0164 0.006 -2.57 0.01 
Higher Secondary 
(HSEC) 0.6092 -0.0256 0.007 -3.63 0.00 
Graduate (GRD) 
[Reference] 0.6348 
    Self-employed 
Agriculture (SEA) 0.6135 0.0028 0.006 0.46 0.65 
Self-employed non-
Agriculture (SEnA) 0.6328 0.0221 0.007 2.97 0.00 
Salaried (SAL) 0.6134 0.0026 0.008 0.33 0.74 
Agriculture Wage 
Labour (AWL) 0.6194 0.0087 0.007 1.21 0.23 
Non-Agriculture Wage 
Labour (NAWL) 0.6266 0.0159 0.007 2.22 0.03 
Family Worker (FWK) 0.5959 -0.0148 0.010 -1.54 0.12 
Household Worker 
(HWK) 0.5827 -0.0281 0.006 -4.42 0.00 
Pensioner, Dependent, 
student [Reference] 0.6107 
    National Election 0.5641 -0.0804 0.002 -33.65 0.00 
Local Election 0.6445     
Current Election 0.5811 -0.0344 0.002 -14.06 0.00 
Past Election 0.6155     
Age at Mean 0.6040 0.0006 0.000 5.81 0.00 
   
  
27 
 
5. Attendance and Participation at Gram Sabha Meetings 
Voting is one form of political involvement; attendance at, and participation in, Gram Sabha 
(GS) meetings is an alternative form of representation in local government. In this section, we 
consider attendance and participation in Gram Sabha meetings and study it in the context of similar 
factors that were hypothesized to influence electoral involvement. The average number of Gram 
Sabha meetings held across panchayat periods is approximately 7.6, and shows a decreasing trend, 
with an average of approximately 9 meetings in the previous-to-previous panchayat period to 6 
meetings taking place in the current period. 
Persons were regarded as having ‘participated’ in a Gram Sabha meeting which they attended 
if they answered yes to the question: “when you attend Gram Sabha meetings, do you participate 
actively, presenting issues, raising questions, and voicing your opinion?”  They were regarded as not 
having participated if they answered this question in the negative.  In total, there were 72,617 
responses to this question from 8,586 respondents. This subsample only contains data on those 
individuals for whom voting data was also available. The total participation rate in Gram Sabha 
meetings stood at 46.3% across all panchayat periods: 37% of all persons belonging to the SC 
participated in Gram Sabha meetings at least once compared to 32% for members of the ST. There 
were significant differences in participation rates in Gram Sabha meetings between Hindus and 
Muslims (as well as between the SC and the UC) across all panchayat periods. Members of the UC 
had a significantly higher participation rate relative to members of the SC.  
If electoral participation and participation in Gram Sabha meetings are to be seen as two 
complementary dimensions of involvement in the process of local governance, then it is of interest to 
ask how respondents chose between these two dimensions. Table 5 shows the percentage of 
individuals who voted vis-à-vis the percentage of individuals who took part in GS meetings. 
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Table 5: Participation in Gram Sabha Meetings and Voting Participation in Gram Sabha 
Meetings 
 Yes No 
Voted Yes 45.9 31.5 
No 20.2 13.3 
                                     N = 8,586 individuals 
It was hypothesised that a person’s decision of how many Gram Sabha meetings to attend 
and, then, whether to participate in the meeting would inter alia depend upon the same conditioning 
variables factors employed in the earlier sections on voting along with some additional factors. These 
were: 
a. The notice period available to household members about the Gram Sabha meeting 
b. The total number of Gram Sabha meetings held in that particular period and it’s square 
(since the effect may not be linear) 
c. To test the effect of participation in the current panchayat period, we also include a 
dummy for Gram Sabha meetings held in the current period. 
In the case of participation in GS meetings, two more variables were hypothesised to have an 
impact. These were: 
i. The average length of meetings 
ii. Whether the person knew in advance of the topics to be discussed at the 
meeting 
 
Attendance at Gram Sabha Meetings 
We used an ordinary-least squares (OLS) regression to estimate the impact of various factors 
on the number of Gram Sabha meetings attended. For this sample, the number of meetings attended 
ranged from 0 to 42 for each panchayat period. The average number of meetings attended was 5.08, 
whereas the median number of meetings attended was 3.  The estimates from the model, over 41,453 
observations may be obtained on request from the authors; the results presented in Table 6 are in 
terms of the predicted number of meetings attended.  
 Table 6 shows that the model predicted that the predicted number of meetings attended at 
4.97 was significantly lower than the 5.1 meetings attended by men. The difference between women 
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and men in the average number of meetings attended is, of course the estimated regression coefficient 
on the FEM variable in the OLS regression. Similarly, the predicted average number of meetings 
attended by married persons (5.08) was significantly higher than the predicted average for unmarried 
persons (4.99) where, again, the difference between married and unmarried persons in the average 
number of meetings attended is the estimated regression coefficient on the MAR variable in the OLS 
estimates. 
There were no significant differences between the social groups in the average number of 
meetings attended by their members and, except for the fact that persons with secondary level 
education attended significantly more meetings (5.23) than persons with other educational levels, 
variations in the level of education did not significantly effect the number of meetings attended: 
illiterate persons were predicted to attend as many meetings as graduates (5.05). 
There were, however, significant occupational effects. Compared to the number of meetings 
attended by persons from the reference group of pensioners, dependents, and students (5.21), a 
significantly smaller number of meetings were attended by those who were: salaried workers (4.82), 
agricultural labourers (4.79), non-agricultural labourers (4.91), and household workers (5.0).  With the 
category of employment, it was self-employed persons who were more interested in attending than 
those who were employees. 
There was no significant difference in the predicted number of meetings attended during the 
current panchayat (5.09) and past panchayats (5.07). The predicted number of meetings attended at 
the mean number of meetings held (8.6 over the three panchayat periods) was 4.73 and it was 
predicted that every additional meeting would increase attendance by 0.45 meetings.  Similarly, the 
predicted number of meetings attended at the mean age of the respondents (48.8 years) was 5.18 and it 
was predicted that every additional year of age would increase attendance by 0.014 meetings.  
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Table 6: Predicted and Marginal Number of Gram Sabha Meetings Attended   
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Conditioning Variable Number Attended Marginal Probability SE t value Pr>|t| 
Females 4.97 -0.14 0.06 -2.33 0.02 
Males [Reference] 5.10     
Married 5.08 0.10 0.05 2.04 0.04 
Unmarried [Reference] 4.99     
Scheduled Caste (SC) 5.12 0.07 0.04 1.59 0.11 
Scheduled Tribe (ST) 5.12 0.07 0.07 0.92 0.36 
Other Backward Classes 
(OBC) 
5.07 0.02 0.04 0.45 0.65 
Upper Castes (UC) 
[Reference] 
5.05     
Illiterate (ILT) 5.05 0.00 0.07 -0.01 0.99 
Primary (PRM) 5.02 -0.03 0.07 -0.42 0.68 
Secondary (SEC) 5.23 0.18 0.07 2.72 0.01 
Higher Secondary 
(HSEC) 
5.10 0.05 0.07 0.77 0.44 
Graduate (GRD) 
[Reference] 
5.05     
Self-employed 
Agriculture (SEA) 
5.26 0.05 0.07 0.73 0.46 
Self-employed non-
Agriculture (SEnA) 
5.09 -0.12 0.08 -1.52 0.13 
Salaried (SAL) 4.82 -0.39 0.09 -4.48 0.00 
Agriculture Wage 
Labour (AWL) 
4.79 -0.42 0.07 -5.76 0.00 
Non-Agriculture Wage 
Labour (NAWL) 
4.91 -0.30 0.08 -3.82 0.00 
Family Worker (FWK) 5.11 -0.10 0.12 -0.83 0.41 
Household Worker 
(HWK) 
5.00 -0.21 0.09 -2.41 0.02 
Pensioner, Dependent, 
student [Reference] 
5.21     
Current Panchayat 5.09 0.03 0.03 1.08 0.28 
Past Panchayat 5.07     
Advance notice >1 week 5.12 0.36 0.05 7.65 0.00 
Advance notice <1 week 4.75     
Number of meetings 
held (at mean=8.6) 
4.73 0.45 0.00 139.43 0.00 
Age (at mean=48.8) 5.18 0.014 0.00 11.98 0.00 
Number of meetings 
held (at mean=8.6) 
4.73 0.4517 0.003 139.47 0.00 
 
Participation in Gram Sabha Meetings  
 In order to investigate the factors underlying participation in Gram Sabha meetings, we 
estimated a logit equation in which the dependent variable was coded 1 if the person answered 
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affirmatively to the following question: “when you attend Gram Sabha meetings, do you participate 
actively, presenting issues, raising questions, and voicing your opinion?” If the answer to this question 
was a ‘yes’, the variable was coded 1, and was coded 0 if the answer was ‘no’.  (It is important to 
emphasise that a particular person did not necessarily always participate or not participate – he/she 
may well have recorded a value of 1 for some meetings and 0 for others).  The participation equation 
was estimated over 33,757 responses from persons who were at least 30 years of age at the time of the 
survey and it predicted that 55.7% of the responses would have said that they had ‘participated’. 
Hereafter, this referred to as the ‘participation rate’.  If, however, the respondent’s attributes had been 
held at the mean values this participation rate would have been 57.1%.  In other words, there was not 
much difference between the average participation rate (55.7%) and the participation rate of the 
average person (57.1%). 
 The specific results from the estimated equation are shown in Table 7 in terms of the 
probabilities (column 2) and the marginal probabilities (column 3) of voting.  The first point to note is 
that compared to the male participation rate of 59.61%, the female rate was significantly and 
considerably lower at 41.45%. This probably the most worrisome feature of the results: even when 
women attend Gram Sabha meetings, their voice was much less likely to be heard than that of men.  
The participation rate for married persons (55.59%) was slightly, but significantly, below that 
of unmarried persons (57.48%). Compared to the 57.05% participation rate of persons from the 
(reference group of) UC, it was only the participation rate of OBC persons (54.63%) that was 
significantly different; other than that, social group did not affect participation. 
 The participation rate rose with the educational status of persons. The reference group of 
graduates had the highest participation rate (63.3%); compared to that, the participation rate of 
persons with lesser educational qualifications was significantly lower with illiterate persons having 
the lowest participation rate (52.52%).  
In terms of occupation, there was no statistical difference between the participation rates of 
persons in the reference category (pensioners, dependents, students) and that of salaried workers, and 
those in agricultural self-employment: respectively, 60.33%, 59.74%, and 59.65%. However, the 
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participation rates for the other groups were significantly lower with the participation rate being 
lowest for household workers (47.71%). 
There was a significant difference in the predicted participation rates during the current 
panchayat (58.71%) and past panchayats (53.72%). Each additional meeting held increased the 
participation rate by 0.3 points. 
Table 7: Predicted and Marginal Probabilities of Participating in Gram Sabha Meetings  
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Conditioning Variable Probability Marginal Probability SE t value Pr>|t| 
Females 0.4145 -0.1816 0.011 -15.89 0.00 
Males [Reference] 0.5961     
Married 0.5559 -0.0190 0.009 -2.23 0.03 
Unmarried [Reference] 0.5748     
Scheduled Caste (SC) 0.5664 -0.0041 0.008 -0.53 0.60 
Scheduled Tribe (ST) 0.5519 -0.0186 0.013 -1.46 0.15 
Other Backward Classes 
(OBC) 
0.5463 -0.0242 0.007 -3.69 0.00 
Upper Castes (UC) 
[Reference] 
0.5705     
Illiterate (ILT) 0.5252 -0.1078 0.012 -8.91 0.00 
Primary (PRM) 0.5619 -0.0711 0.012 -6.03 0.00 
Secondary (SEC) 0.5891 -0.0440 0.012 -3.74 0.00 
Higher Secondary (HSEC) 0.5797 -0.0534 0.012 -4.35 0.00 
Graduate (GRD) 
[Reference] 
0.6330     
Self-employed Agriculture 
(SEA) 
0.5965 -0.0069 0.013 -0.54 0.59 
Self-employed non-
Agriculture (SEnA) 
0.5315 -0.0718 0.015 -4.88 0.00 
Salaried (SAL) 0.5974 -0.0059 0.016 -0.37 0.71 
Agriculture Wage Labour 
(AWL) 
0.5396 -0.0638 0.014 -4.56 0.00 
Non-Agriculture Wage 
Labour (NAWL) 
0.5227 -0.0807 0.015 -5.43 0.00 
Family Worker (FWK) 0.5603 -0.0431 0.025 -1.75 0.08 
Household Worker (HWK) 0.4771 -0.1262 0.017 -7.48 0.00 
Pensioner, Dependent, 
student [Reference] 
0.6033     
Current Panchayat 0.5871 0.0499 0.005 10.04 0.00 
Past Panchayat 0.5372     
Advance notice >1 week 0.5701 0.1038 0.009 11.73 0.00 
Advance notice <1 week 0.4663     
Agenda known in advance 0.6002 0.1212 0.005 22.72 0.00 
Agenda not known in 
advance 
0.4790     
Number of meetings held 
(at mean=8.6) 
0.5505 0.0031 0.001 3.92 0.00 
Number of meetings 
attended (at mean=4.66 
0.5583 0.0053 0.001 5.52 0.00 
Age (at mean=48.8) 0.5574 0.014 0.00 11.98 0.00 
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6.  Ideal Types 
 The predicted probabilities from Table 1 allowed one to identify “ideal types” where ideal 
types represent hypothetical cases with specified characteristics. For example, the voter most likely to 
vote would be an older SC married man, educated up to primary level, and working as an agricultural 
wage labourer (Ideal Type A); conversely, the voter who would be least likely to vote would be a 
young, illiterate, unmarried ST woman who was a dependent (Ideal Type B).   
 Similarly, from Table 2, we can identify the types of women most likely (Type A) and least 
likely (Type B). A type A woman would be an unmarried, dependent, illiterate, ST woman who was 
30 years old. A type B woman would be a 60 year old, graduate, SC woman working in a salaried job.  
Again, one can compute the probability of voting of each of these types and test whether the 
difference between the probabilities of Cases A and B is statistically significant.  
Table 3 allows one to identify the person type most likely (Type A) and least likely (Type B) 
to vote along caste lines. The former was an OBC, 60 year old, graduate, married woman who was 
either a pensioner or a dependent; the latter was a 30 year old, UC, unmarried male who was educated 
to secondary level.  
Table 4 tells us that the person most likely to vote on the basis of a candidate’s reputation for 
honesty and fairness (Type A) would be a 30 year old, unmarried, graduate ST man who was self-
employed in non-agriculture. Conversely, the person least likely to vote on the basis of a candidate’s 
reputation for honesty and fairness would be a 60 year old, married, OBC woman who was illiterate 
and did household work. 
According to Table 6, the person most likely to attend Gram Sabha meetings would be a 60 
year old SC male, educated to secondary level and self-employed in agriculture (Type A); the person 
least likely to attend these meetings would be an illiterate, 30 year old unmarried, UC woman working 
as an agricultural wage labourer (Type B). 
Lastly, Table 7 suggests that the person most likely to participate at Gram Sabha meetings 
would be a 60 year old SC married man who was educated up to secondary level and was self-
employed in agriculture (Type A).  Conversely, the person least likely to participate at Gram Sabha 
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meetings would be a 30 year old UC unmarried woman who was illiterate and worked as an 
agricultural wage labourer (Type B). 
After identifying the ‘ideal types’, such that the probability of observing the relevant outcome 
was highest for Type A and lowest for Type B, one can proceed to computing the probability of the 
event for each of these types, A and B, and then to test whether the difference between their 
probabilities was statistically significant.  
Table 8, which reports the results of this exercise, shows that, for all the probabilistic 
outcomes, there was a considerable difference between the probabilities of Type A (highest 
probability) and Type B (lowest probability) and that, in terms of attendance, there was also a marked 
difference between the meetings attended by Type A and Type B persons.  Furthermore, as the results 
of the statistical tests show, these differences were all significantly different from zero.    
Table 8: Outcome Probabilities for ‘Ideal Types 
 Probabilities (%) Difference Test Statistics 
 Type A Type B Type A - Type B SE Z value Pr>|z| 
Voting 92.6 75.1 17.5 0.01 15.4 0.0 
Voting by Spouse’s Instructions 73.0 55.4 17.6 0.03 5.6 0.0 
Voting by Caste 21.5 12.1 9.4 0.01 9.1 0.0 
Voting by Candidate Honesty 70.1 53.6 16.5 0.01 15.3 0.0 
Participation in Gram Sabha Meetings 69.3 33.8 35.5 0.02 19.1 0.0 
 Meetings Attended Difference SE Z Pr>|z| 
Attendance at Gram Sabha Meetings 5.7 4.2 1.5 0.1 14.5 0.0 
 
7.  Conclusions 
The issue of voting on the basis of one’s social identity, as opposed to voting as an individual, 
has recently attracted attention in the literature.  Ben-Bassat and Dahan (2012), using data on Arab 
communities, examined the effect of social affiliation on actual voter turnout in local elections in 
Israel. They tested whether voters with a particular last name, which serves as a proxy for hamula (or 
clan) affiliation, were more likely to vote for a candidate with the same last name, as compared to 
other candidates, and found strong-evidence for hamula-based voting behaviour.12 They also tested 
whether individuals who felt part of a group were more likely to participate in elections and found that 
that voter turnout in Arab localities is significantly higher than in Jewish localities – which have 
                                                     
12 In the Palestinian territories, clans (locally called hamulas) have become a focus of political activity and 
major hubs of local power. 
35 
 
social structures more in common with European communities - controlling for the standard list of 
explanatory variables. This result is in line with the notion that communities with stronger senses of 
social attachment (Arab localities) are more likely to participate in elections. 
These ideas resonate very clearly in the Indian political context.  It is a fact of Indian political 
life that voter turnout among the poor is greater than among the rich. One explanation for this is that 
the poor are organised into vote banks in terms of their social identity (for example, lower castes, 
Muslims) and vote because there is material benefit associated with voting for their group. As we 
argued in the introduction, the evidence is that the importance of vote banks based on the quid pro 
quo of material benefits to groups has declined. Instead, it is more reasonable to view the high voter 
turnout by the poor as an expression of identity and presence. This identity may be social, defined 
either in caste or religious terms, but presence may relate to a general desire to flex one’s political 
muscles by reminding the governing classes of the folly of neglecting a significant portion of the 
electorate.  
In the last 20 years Indian politics has changed in three important ways. Perhaps the most 
dramatic has been the fragmentation of politics as the lower castes have left the Congress party’s 
upper-caste dominated ‘big tent’ to set up their own parties in opposition to the Congress. As Jodhka 
(2012) observes, there is a weakening of traditional caste relations based on status and hierarchy and 
this has been facilitated by India’s lower classes rising to challenge, at the ballot box, the traditional 
political hegemony of India’s upper castes (Jaffrelot, 2003). 
The second important change is that, as a consequence of political fragmentation, national 
governments, following the general elections of 1999, 2004, and 2009, have been formed by alliances 
comprising a cluster of regional parties led by a national party – the BJP-led National Democratic 
Alliance of 1999 and the Congress-led United Progressive Alliance of 2004 and 2009. (Ruparelia, 
2011). For alliances formed before the election this has meant seat sharing with the result that 
traditional workers and supporters of Party X have suddenly had to shift their allegiance, not always 
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successfully or with enthusiasm, to Party X.13 In addition to the reasons cited in the introduction, this 
factor too has contributed to the decline of ‘vote bank’ politics as the presence of alien candidates has 
strained traditional party loyalties (Banerjee, 2014, p. 78-79). 
The third aspect of change has been village level elections under the auspices of the 
Panchayati Raj brought into being by the 73rd Constitution Amendment Act of 1993 with the 
accompanying provision that one-third of the total number of positions of gram pradhan would be 
held by women with another proportion held by the SC/ST.  This has engaged a tranche of persons in 
political activity that previously had no experience or, indeed, the opportunity, of participating in 
public life (Krishna, 2010; Corbridge, Harris, and Jeffrey, 2013).          
These three aspects justify the emphasis in this paper on political participation in terms of the 
individual-citizen (rather than by purely group loyalties) albeit constrained by considerations of 
gender and caste. The unique feature of this study was that it provided a quantitative analysis of 
political participation in rural India with respect to voting and to attendance/participation in Gram 
Sabha meetings.  This analysis was conducted in terms of common set of explanatory variables – 
social group, gender, age, marital status, education, and occupation. A novel twist was provided by 
allowing each of these variables to interact with whether the election was a ‘national’ or a ‘local’ 
election and with whether the election was conducted during the current or past panchayat periods.  
The estimated equations permitted predicted probabilities to be computed under a variety of scenarios 
and, from these scenarios, it was possible to cull ‘ideal types’ of persons – those with the highest and 
lowest probabilities of experiencing a particular outcome. 
A worrisome feature of the results was the high proportion of married women reporting that 
they voted according to their husbands’ instructions and further that, this proportion was impervious 
to the education level of the women. Women’s education would not appear, from these results, to 
reduce the power of patriarchy.  However, the fact that a secret ballot can drive a wedge between 
professed and actual actions might serve to ameliorate this.    
                                                     
13 For example, the AIDMK-CPM and the DMK-Congress alliances in Tamil Nadu meant that traditional 
AIDMK supporters had to support CPM candidates and traditional DMK supporters had to support Congress 
candidates. 
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Another source of anxiety was the gender gap in the proportion of men and women who took 
part in Gram Sabha discussions.  This would suggest that the reservation of village panchayat 
positions (including that of panchayat pradhan, or village president) for women was a step in the right 
direction for the empowerment of women. In contrast, there were no inter-social group differences in 
participation in Gram Sabha meetings. 
The paper suggests several avenues for further research based on the data from REDS. First, 
there is the question of the consequences of political participation in terms of good village governance 
and levels of village development. Second, there is the question of differences in political 
participation between the upper (the ‘creamy layer’) and lower echelons of the lower castes and it is 
possible to address this because the REDS data also provides information on household sub-caste. 
Third, but by no means last, is the question of the level of village level conflict in the wake of the 73rd 
amendment which, by establishing Gram Sabhas, has diluted the oligarchic hegemony of the upper 
castes in public policy matters pertaining to the village.     
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Appendix 
 
Table A1: Estimation Results from the Logit Voting Model with Interactions on Election Type 
and Election Period 
Yi=1, if voted Odds Ratio Std. Err. z P>z 
National Election (NE) 0.278 0.060 -5.88 0.00 
Social group 
Scheduled Caste (SC) 1.204 0.048 4.62 0.00 
Scheduled Tribe (ST) 1.096 0.065 1.55 0.12 
Other Backward Classes (OBC) 1.147 0.034 4.58 0.00 
Reference Group: Upper Classes 
Interaction of NE and Group 
NE×SC 0.645 0.036 -7.83 0.00 
NE×ST 0.853 0.057 -2.37 0.02 
NE×OBC 0.625 0.024 -12.12 0.00 
Current Election (CE) 30.587 6.664 15.70 0.00 
Interaction of CE and Group 
CE×SC 1.151 0.063 2.59 0.01 
CE×ST 0.921 0.058 -1.31 0.19 
CE×OBC 0.960 0.035 -1.12 0.26 
Female 0.874 0.043 -2.75 0.01 
Interaction of NE and Female 
NE×Female 0.872 0.058 -2.06 0.04 
Interaction of CE and Female 
CE×Female 1.303 0.085 4.06 0.00 
Age 1.108 0.007 16.99 0.00 
Age2 0.999 0.000 -14.04 0.00 
Interaction of NE and Age 
NE×Age 1.122 0.009 13.92 0.00 
Interaction of NE and Age2 
NE×Age2 0.999 0.000 -11.88 0.00 
Interaction of CE and Age 
CE×Age 0.912 0.008 -11.10 0.00 
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Interaction of CE and Age2 
CE×Age2 1.001 0.000 8.99 0.00 
Married 1.148 0.045 3.52 0.00 
Interaction of NE and Married 
NE×Married 1.078 0.060 1.35 0.18 
Interaction of CE and Married 
CE×Married 0.910 0.049 -1.77 0.08 
Occupation 
Self-employed Agriculture (SEA) 1.306 0.082 4.25 0.00 
Self-employed non-Agriculture (SEnA) 1.115 0.085 1.43 0.15 
Salaried (SAL) 0.933 0.074 -0.87 0.38 
Agriculture Wage Labour (AWL) 1.278 0.094 3.34 0.00 
Non-Agriculture Wage Labour (NAWL) 1.093 0.080 1.21 0.23 
Family Worker (FWK) 0.908 0.090 -0.98 0.33 
Household Worker (HWK) 1.087 0.072 1.27 0.21 
Reference category: Pensioner, Dependent, Student 
Interaction of NE and Occupation 
NE×SEA 0.922 0.086 -0.87 0.38 
NE×SEnA 1.005 0.114 0.05 0.96 
NE×SAL 0.830 0.096 -1.61 0.11 
NE×AWL 0.840 0.089 -1.65 0.10 
NE×NAWL 1.139 0.125 1.19 0.23 
NE×FWK 0.841 0.120 -1.22 0.22 
NE×HWK 0.932 0.089 -0.74 0.46 
Interaction of CE and Occupation 
CE×SEA 0.899 0.076 -1.27 0.21 
CE×SEnA 1.220 0.128 1.90 0.06 
CE×SAL 1.152 0.126 1.29 0.20 
CE×AWL 1.176 0.115 1.65 0.10 
CE×NAWL 1.098 0.110 0.93 0.35 
CE×FWK 1.166 0.162 1.10 0.27 
CE×HWK 1.034 0.092 0.38 0.71 
Education 
Illiterate (ILT) 1.324 0.084 4.45 0.00 
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Primary (PRM) 1.263 0.081 3.62 0.00 
Secondary (SEC) 0.996 0.062 -0.06 0.95 
Higher Secondary (HSEC) 1.265 0.088 3.39 0.00 
Reference Category: Degree or Higher 
Interaction of NE and Education 
NE×ILT 0.851 0.075 -1.83 0.07 
NE×PRM 0.973 0.089 -0.30 0.76 
NE×SEC 1.095 0.097 1.02 0.31 
NE×HSEC 0.749 0.073 -2.97 0.00 
Interaction of NE and Education 
CE×ILT 0.613 0.053 -5.61 0.00 
CE×PRM 0.800 0.072 -2.48 0.01 
CE×SEC 1.071 0.094 0.78 0.44 
CE×HSEC 0.783 0.076 -2.51 0.01 
 
Number of observations 181556 
LR chi2(284) 29012.19 
Prob > chi2 0.00 
Pseudo R2 0.19 
Log likelihood  -62191.732 
 
